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1 Executive Summary 
The project “European Airport Movement Management by A-SMGCS” (EMMA), an Integrated 
Project launched by the European Commission in its sixth framework programme, was executed 
between March 2004 and April 2006. The aim of the EMMA project was to mature and validate the 
A-SMGCS concept levels 1&2 by setting de facto standards for A-SMGCS systems and their 
operational usage and by the streamlining of existing products. The EMMA project brought  
A-SMGCS one further step towards the harmonised European implementation of A-SMGCS.  
 
In close cooperation with EUROCONTROL, the advanced operational concept for A-SMGCS levels 
1&2 has been proven and strengthened by the implementation of levels 1&2 A-SMGCS and extensive 
validation and verification (V&V) activities at three different European airports: Milano-Malpensa, 
Prague-Ruzynĕ, and Toulouse-Blagnac. In Prague-Ruzynĕ, controllers went as far as to work with the 
system in low visibility conditions, although this was not expected within the time-frame of the 
EMMA project. Measurement indicators and test procedures were defined and a significant amount of 
data was collected during the functional and operational tests. Controllers and pilots actively 
participated and contributed to the results. The analysis resulted in detailed recommendations 
covering: 
• the concept of an A-SMGCS levels 1&2,  
• the technical and operational requirements, 
• procedures,  
• implementation issues (e.g. safety assessment, training and licensing), and 
• detailed recommendations for a harmonised A-SMGCS V&V methodology. 
 
Further on, this document provides detailed recommendations to the respective stakeholders (i.e. users, 
R&D institutions, industry, and the European Commission as the contractor).  
 
In an additional innovative study, a preliminary concept and an implementation roadmap for a 
complete A-SMGCS, considering higher-level services like routing, planning, and the air-ground 
integration, has been proposed to prepare the successor project EMMA2. 
 
Summary of recommendations 
In the following summary are listed the nine most important EMMA recommendations and ‘lessons 
learnt’: 
 
EMMA R1 It is recognised that flight crews do not comply with the transponder operating 
procedures consistently even when they are published in AIPs and are known to the 
airlines. One main reason could be a non-standardised symbolism applied to the 
transponder control panels in cockpits of all kinds of manufacturers. It is 
recommended to include type/manufacturer specific procedures in the pre-flight 
preparation procedures/checklists and in the aircraft operations manual to further 
improve pilots’ compliancy. 
 
EMMA R2 It is recommended, as was proven in EMMA, that, where the A-SMGCS provides 
an identification label for Mode-S equipped cooperating aircraft, air traffic 
controllers (ATCOs) can use the A-SMGCS surveillance display as a primary 
means for identification.  
 
EMMA R3 In order to use the surveillance display safely and efficiently in all visibility 
conditions, it is recommended that all aircraft and vehicle movements, which intend 
to use the manoeuvring area, should be properly equipped to be co-operative with 
an A-SMGCS in order to provide their identity on the ATCO’s surveillance display. 
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EMMA R4 Implementing A-SMGCS levels 1&2 at an airport requires intensive adaptation 
(tuning) to obtain a sufficient and reliable system performance. It is recommended 
that sufficient time and resources be allocated to this task. 
 
EMMA R5 It is recommended to tune the runway monitoring and alerting function (level 2) in a 
real-time simulation with local ATCOs before running it operationally at the airport. 
 
EMMA R6 It was found that the most useful means of assessing surveillance detection 
capability and coverage is to plot target position reports onto an aerodrome map 
over a period of time. This method clearly identifies areas with gaps in coverage and 
areas where false reports occur.  
 
EMMA R7 Some performance requirements are difficult to measure and verify by short-term 
testing only. Results are highly dependent on the measurement method and there are 
significant temporal variations. The EMMA tests indicate that verification of such 
requirements really needs continuous long-term observation over a period of several 
weeks. Automatic assessment tools, like the MOGADOR tool used in EMMA, may 
help here.  
 
EMMA R8 The use of a standardised and well-proven validation approach is recommended for 
achieving reliable and robust V&V results. The use of the MAEVA Validation 
Guideline Handbook [1] with its stepped evaluation view contributed substantially 
to the production of reliable validation results. In future validation projects, the 
European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) [3] should be 
consulted as well. 
 
EMMA R9 The concept and implementation roadmap for a complete A-SMGCS, developed in 
EMMA (cf. [9]), are strongly recommended to take into account the current and 
future ATM master plans to build up an acceptable equilibrium between equipment, 
procedures and interoperability with the adjacent systems. 
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2 Introduction 
With the two former European Commission framework programmes (FP4 and FP5), the DG-TREN 
co-funded two other large A-SMGCS implementation projects: DEFAMM (Demonstration Facilities 
for Airport Movement guidance control and Management) and BETA (operational Benefit Evaluation 
by Testing an A-SMGCS), aiming at the following levels of technological maturity: 
 
• Demonstration of the A-SMGCS technology (DEFAMM); 
• First A-SMGCS implementations under operational conditions to measure potential benefits 
(BETA). 
 
In line with this evolutionary approach, FP6 introduced EMMA (European airport Movement 
Management by A-SMGCS) with the scope of initiating a harmonised implementation of A-SMGCS 
levels 1&2. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Projects’ evolution 
 
Within the EMMA project, A-SMGCS test-bed systems were installed, verified and validated at three 
different airports (Prague-Ruzynĕ, Toulouse-Blagnac, and Milano-Malpensa). The definition of 
common operational procedures, the verification of the technical performance and the validation of the 
use of the system are described in the EMMA operational concept documents (OSED [9] and ORD 
[11]) and in the analysis report [29].  
 
This recommendation report aims in assisting to navigate through the different documents. It also 
derives the main conclusions to help service providers in installing their own A-SMGCS by following 
these recommendations, to avoid possible mistakes and to focus on site dependent constraints. 
 
The report is divided into the following chapters: 
• Chapter 3 Summary of EMMA concept and V&V results 
• Chapter 4 EMMA Recommendations 
• Chapter 5 Remaining open issues 
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3 Summary of EMMA concept and V&V results 
3.1 EMMA concept for an A-SMGCS levels 1&2 
The EMMA A-SMGCS concept is described in the following EMMA SP1 documents: 
 
• the Operational Service and Environment Description (OSED) [9], 
• the Operational Requirement Document (ORD) [11], and 
• the Technical Requirements Document (TRD) [14]. 
 
All these documents make extensive references to the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual [31] and the 
EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS concept documents [5] [6]. The EMMA A-SMGCS implementations 
and V&V activities focussed on EUROCONTROL’s levels 1&2 concept, although EMMA outlined a 
more comprehensive concept that also considers higher-level A-SMGCS services (e.g. planning, 
routing, and on-board services).  
 
The EMMA A-SMGCS concept, which includes both operational requirements and associated 
procedures, has been set out in document D135u ORD [11]. The EMMA concept states:  
 
“The objective of an A-SMGCS is to optimise the efficiency, capacity and safety of operations at an 
aerodrome. The surface movement infrastructure existing at many airports today can be enhanced by 
providing positive identification of traffic, improving all weather situation awareness, improving 
communications and navigation aids, and by providing route planning tools.”, §2.1 [11], (compare 
also ICAO doc 9830, §1.2 [31]).  
 
Except for the “improving communications and navigation aids by providing route planning tools” 
aspects, which are higher-level A-SMGCS services to be covered in EMMA2, the above objective was 
proven with the EMMA A-SMGCS implementations in the simulator and on-site at the airports. For 
instance, the simulation trials revealed that A-SMGCS is able to reduce the average taxi time, the load 
of the R/T communication, and the controller’s reaction time in case of a conflict situation (see §3 or 
[26] for more details).  
 
These operational improvement objectives, which were measured on a real-time simulation test 
platform, could also be confirmed with controllers’ subjective statements in the field. Controllers at 
Prague-Ruzynĕ were asked to estimate their perceived safety and efficiency when they work with  
A-SMGCS compared to earlier times when they did not use an A-SMGCS. Their positive answers and 
also the feedback from the shadow-mode trials with DSNA and ENAV ATCOs at Toulouse-Blagnac 
and Milano-Malpensa showed that A-SMGCS provides significant operational improvements that will 
result in operational benefits for all stakeholders of an A-SMGCS (see [29] for more details). These 
results validated the levels 1&2 concept of an A-SMGCS.  
 
3.2 EMMA Verification and Validation (V&V) results 
At three test sites, Prague-Ruzynĕ, Toulouse-Blagnac, and Milano-Malpensa a levels 1&2 A-SMGCS 
has been implemented and tested. On-site trials were mainly used to verify that the implemented  
A-SMGCS fulfils the technical and operational requirements and to get feedback from the operators 
with respect to its operational feasibility.  
 
Toulouse-Blagnac and Milano-Malpensa evaluated the A-SMGCS in shadow-mode trials, which 
provided important feedback to the technical and operational performance. Prague-Ruzynĕ already 
started with the earlier BETA project to implement an A-SMGCS and thus could rely on an already 
matured system. The controllers from Air navigation Services of the Czech Republic (ANS CR) used 
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the A-SMGCS in Prague operationally under all visibility conditions. At the time of the validation 
activities the ANS CR controllers had already used the A-SMGCS for more than seven months and 
thus were able to give experienced feedback about its operational feasibility and operational 
improvements.  
 
In addition to that, real-time simulations were carried out with Prague ANS CR and Malpensa ENAV 
controllers by using traffic scenarios of their own airport environment. These simulation trials were 
mainly used to substantiate operational improvements with respect to safety and efficiency. 
 
All the main technical and operational requirements could be verified (cf. [29]). For this purpose, 
technical short- and long-term measurements were conducted. The three systems implemented by 
EMMA could not always meet the levels of performance published in international standards (e.g. 
99.90% probability of detection), but the controllers felt that the observed level of performance (e.g. 
99.65% probability of detection measure in Prague-Ruzynĕ) was acceptable anyway.  
 
For the long-term system performance measurements, the MOGADOR tool was used. MOGADOR is 
a tool developed by DSNA that fully automatically analyses surveillance performance parameters 
from long-term recordings of regular airport traffic (for more details cf. [8]). This tool provided 
interesting results that can also be used to tune and adapt the A-SMGCS to meet the operational needs.  
 
The on-site trials at Prague revealed that controllers who have worked operationally with the  
A-SMGCS fully accepted the A-SMGCS and thus approved its “operational feasibility”. Statements 
like: 
 
• “When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft on the taxiways is 
accurate enough to exercise control in a safe and efficient way.”, or 
• “I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to determine that an aircraft has 
vacated the runway.”, or 
• “The information displayed in the A-SMGCS is helpful for avoiding conflicts.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS provides the right information at the right time.”, or 
• “When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be used 
to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.” 
 
have been significantly confirmed by 15 ANS CR controllers (all results to be found in [26]). The 
statements mainly referred to the surveillance service of the A-SMGCS, because ATCOs in Prague-
Ruzynĕ have not yet used operationally the full scope of the monitoring and alerting function, but only 
the “stop bar crossing” alerts as a first step. However, real-time simulations and real flight tests were 
used to create additional conflict situations (e.g. runway incursions, arrival-arrival conflicts, etc.). 
Results showed that the controllers also accepted the performance of the other alerts. Those results 
were also supported by the impressions of the ENAV (Malpensa) and DSNA (Toulouse-Blagnac) 
controllers who tested their systems in a passive “shadow-mode” environment (all results to be found 
in [27] and [28]). 
 
Validation of operational improvements was mainly performed through real-time simulations (RTS). 
The most important unexpected result of the RTS was that A-SMGCS is able to reduce the average 
taxi time. In total, the average taxi time was reduced by 5.5% and showed to be statistically highly 
significant with 358 total movements [29]. Up to 18% taxi time reduction was measured in dense 
traffic scenarios. 
 
Furthermore, A-SMGCS reduces the load of the R/T communication. With Prague RTS a 
statistically significant reduction of 16.0% was measured [29].  
 
An additional operational improvement can be assumed with the “controller’s reaction time in case 
of a conflict situation”: 5.3 seconds with A-SMGCS instead of 6.0 seconds without A-SMGCS. 
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The improved reaction time showed an interesting trend but was found to be statistically not 
significant. Further tests with a bigger sample size should reduce the ambiguity. 
 
In the field, controllers were also asked to estimate their perceived safety and efficiency when they 
worked with A-SMGCS compared to earlier times when they did not use an A-SMGCS. The 
following main results were gained with Prague-Ruzynĕ controllers, which were all significantly and 
positively answered (all results to be found in [26]): 
 
• “When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to operate safer.”, or 
• “I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent runway incursions.”, or 
• “When visual reference is not possible, I think identifying an aircraft or vehicle is more 
efficient when using the surveillance display.”, or 
• “I think, also in good visibility conditions, identifying an aircraft or vehicle is even more 
efficient when using the surveillance display.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS enables me to execute my tasks more efficiently.”, or 
• “The number of position reports will be reduced when using A-SMGCS (e.g. aircraft vacating 
runway-in-use).”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS enables me to handle more traffic when visual reference is not possible.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS display gives me a better situational awareness.”, or 
• “When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to reduce my workload.” 
 
In shadow-mode field trials, performed at Toulouse-Blagnac and Milano-Malpensa, the DSNA and 
ENAV ATCOs also had an overall positive feeling about the ability of A-SMGCS to improve 
operations (see [29]). All those examples further support the hypothesis that A-SMGCS provides 
significant operational improvements that will result in operational benefits for all stakeholders of an 
A-SMGCS.  
 
 
EMMA 
Recommendations Report DLR 
 
Save date: 2007-02-07 Public Page 12 
File Name: D681_RECOM_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
4 EMMA Recommendations 
4.1 Recommendations related to the V&V process 
The objective of the EMMA verification and validation (V&V) process was to assess the performance 
of the EMMA A-SMGCS on-board (aircraft and vehicles) and at the three project sites (i.e. Toulouse, 
Prague, and Malpensa). The experience and knowledge obtained during the EMMA project V&V 
process led to the development of the following main V&V recommendations:  
 
a) The use of a standardised and well-proven validation approach is helpful for achieving reliable 
and robust V&V results, and for reaching a consensus on the method within the consortium. 
The use of the MAEVA VGH (see Ref. [1]) with its stepped evaluation view contributed 
substantially to the production of reliable validation results. In future validation projects, the 
European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM, see Ref. [3]) should be 
used instead. The E-OCVM builds on the MAEVA stepped validation approach adding, 
amongst others, a lifecycle view to the validation process that helps to determine the necessary 
validation activities in each of the concept lifecycle phases. However, as the methodology 
does not describe verification, these activities have to be integrated into the validation 
approach. 
 
b) The development of a V&V master plan (see Ref. [17]) at an early stage of the project 
constitutes an essential prerequisite for organising and effectively managing the V&V process. 
In fact, the V&V master plan should ideally be part of the proposal itself. 
 
c) With EMMA, V&V has been split into four stages (cf. Figure 4-1), which proved very useful 
to organise V&V objectives. 
Operational Improvements
Operational Feasibility
Technical 
Tests
Operational Benefits
Verification
Validation
 
Figure 4-1: Stages of EMMA V&V activities 
d) Real-time simulation platforms proved to be appropriate means for testing non-nominal and 
safety-critical events, adapting technical parameters to the users’ needs, and substantiating 
operational improvements in real experimental conditions. Field trials, on the other hand, are 
the irreplaceable means for proving the technical and operational feasibility of a new system. 
 
e) EMMA recommends using automatic long-term system performance assessment tools in the 
field to get support to verify and to tune the new level 1&2 system to meet the local specifics 
of an aerodrome.  
 
The MOGADOR tool developed by DSNA has been refined within EMMA. The MOGADOR 
tool is an automatic system performance assessment tool that needs to know about local 
regulations and the airport environment in order to match the measured system surveillance 
output with the actual traffic. For this reason, the tool needs considerable adaptation to suit the 
airport specifics and the specifics of the used surveillance equipment in order to enable a 
correct automatic assessment of the system performance.  
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f) For the purpose of analysis and to progressively update and improve the safety net settings, it 
proved to be useful to retain electronic records of the alerts and the traffic situation 
respectively. 
 
4.2 Recommendations related to technical requirements 
The EMMA technical requirements document D142au_TRD-GND [14] derived the most important 
requirements from the ICAO A-SMGCS manual [31], EUROCAE ED-87A [30], and 
EUROCONTROL levels 1&2 operational concept and requirements documents [5] [6], and put 
together a comprehensive list of technical requirements. These technical requirements were tested at 
all three test sites and most of them could be verified (cf. EMMA D671 V&V analysis report [29]).  
 
Problems mainly arose with technical surveillance requirements that were derived from operational 
performance requirements. The surveillance requirements were tested by separate technical short-term 
and long-term tests using test cars, test aircraft, and automatic evaluation tools (e.g. MOGADOR). In 
that way, 18 technical tests were performed (see the detailed results in §2.4 in D671 [29]).  
 
By comparison of the three test sites, it was recognised that a complete coverage of the aerodrome is 
frequently a challenging objective. Incomplete coverage is mainly observed because there is an 
insufficient quantity of sensors to provide line-of-sight detection of all aircraft and vehicles on the 
movement area. Possible mitigation means are additional “gap filler” solutions (e.g. camera systems), 
additional SMRs, and/or the introduction of operational regulations to allow only co-operative 
movements in certain movement areas, combined of course with the correct application of the 
transponder operating procedures at the on-board side. 
 
A long and meticulous tuning phase is necessary to obtain adequate system performance. EMMA 
recommends not underestimating the time and effort required for the tuning phase with the 
implementation of A-SMGCS levels 1&2. 
 
With such a tuning phase, EMMA further strongly recommends to plot target position reports onto an 
aerodrome map over a long period of time (at least one week) and to automatically analyse the 
surveillance results by comparing them with re-constructed (or expected) aircraft trajectories. This 
method clearly identifies areas with gaps in coverage and areas where false reports occur, whilst the 
plotting helps tuning the tool and explaining the inconsistencies. Automatic long-term performance 
assessment tools, like MOGADOR, which also provide matrices of detection and identification, are 
recommended. 
 
4.3 Recommendations related to operational requirements 
Operational requirements are the parent requirements for most of the technical requirements. Thus, 
most of the operational requirements have already been verified by technical tests or by a plausibility 
check, e.g. “The installed system shall be modular”.  
 
Other operational requirements, particularly performance requirements, have an interval character, 
where a range of different performances is possible, but a minimum performance has been given that 
must be achieved. Such requirements are also easy to verify but sometimes hard to validate. 
Verification is done by technical tests whereby the measured performance is compared to the 
predefined minimum requirement. Even the operational feasibility of those performance requirements 
can easily be tested by asking the operators if they accept that the current performance is adequate for 
them to work with the system. However, to assess its validity, real experiments with different 
experimental treatments (different system performances) would be needed to decide whether even 
lower performance would be sufficient to meet the users’ needs.  
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Detailed results of all operational requirements by all three test sites can be found in the annex of 
document D671 V&V Analysis Report [29]. Most of the requirements have been verified by technical 
tests or checks. With some of them, the operational feasibility has been tested by asking the controllers 
who actively worked with the system. These additional results have been used either to fully verify the 
requirement, or to reject the system performance in this respect, or to question the requirement in 
terms of its validity.  
 
4.4 Recommendations related to procedures 
With A-SMGCS levels 1&2 mainly two procedures were changed: On the one hand, the ATCO 
aircraft identification procedure, and on the other hand, the pilot transponder operating procedure.   
 
a) With respect to the identification procedure given in D135u ORD §7.2 [11] and the EMMA 
V&V results, it can be stated that ATCOs can use the A-SMGCS surveillance display as a 
primary means for identification, where the A-SMGCS provides an identification label for 
every Mode-S equipped cooperating aircraft.  
 
The role of the ATCOs will not really change with the implementation of an A-SMGCS 
surveillance service, but the above tasks will evolve in the sense that the surveillance service 
will provide the controller with a new source of data about the traffic situation in all visibility 
conditions. This new source of data will complement and can also replace the usual sources 
for surveying the traffic situation. This is done by providing the ATCO with a complete traffic 
situation on a designated surveillance display, also called traffic situation display (TSD). The 
A-SMGCS traffic situation mainly provides the position and the identification of all co-
operative movements and the position of all non-co-operative movements superimposed on a 
map of the aerodrome. Radio telephony (R/T) reports from co-operative movements to inform 
the ATCO of their position or that they have vacated the runway are no longer necessary. 
 
b) The pilot transponder operating procedures were published by EUROCONTROL and shall 
allow aircraft to be automatically identified by an A-SMGCS (see §4 [11]).  
 
ATCOs admitted that the Transponder Operating Procedures (as defined in the D135u ORD 
§4 [11]) are well-defined and meet their operational needs.  
 
However, ATCOs also recognised that flight crews do not comply with these procedures 
consistently even when they are published in AIPs and are known to the airlines. One main 
reason could be a non-standardised symbology applied to the transponder control panels in 
different cockpits from different manufacturers. It is recommended to include aircraft type 
and/or manufacturer specific procedures in the Pre-flight Preparation Procedures/Checklists 
and in the Aircraft Operations Manual to further improve pilot compliancy. 
 
Further Recommendation to A-SMGCS levels 1&2 procedures and regulations: 
 
c) All aircraft or vehicle movements entering the aerodrome manoeuvring area (runways and 
taxiways) must be authorised by the local ATC authority (PANS Doc 4444, §7.5.3.2.1 [32]). 
In order to use the A-SMGCS surveillance display safely and efficiently in all visibility 
conditions, all movements that intend to use the manoeuvring area should be properly 
equipped to be co-operative with an A-SMGCS in order to provide their identity on the 
ATCO’s surveillance display. 
 
d) ATCOs further stated significantly that procedures in case of an A-SMGCS failure are not 
well defined so far. Such procedures or regulations have to be improved, to be matured yet, 
and probably better implemented.  
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e) Existing phraseology (D135u ORD §4 [11]) can be maintained without any change when A-
SMGCS is used.  
 
f) ATCOs further reported that A-SMGCS helps them to detect runway incursions. The two 
stages of alert situation are well accepted by the ATCOs. In the event of an alert being 
generated, the ATCO should assess the situation and should take appropriate actions without 
delay.  
 
4.5 Recommendations related to visibility aspects 
Several statements in the debriefing questionnaire focussed on the visibility conditions: ATCOs stated 
that A-SMGCS helps them in all visibility conditions even when visibility is not impaired. Without 
direct visual reference they rely on the A-SMGCS position reports and the labels with the target 
identification.  
 
Problems arise in low visibility with false targets and the use of the conflict alerting function – as the 
ATCO cannot confirm the target to be false by a visual reference check. Unless false targets are kept 
to a minimum the A-SMGCS cannot be used in an efficient and safe way.  
 
Visibility 3 conditions (see §5 [9]), when pilots can taxi but cannot see sufficiently to avoid collision 
are approximately equivalent to the conditions in which local ANSPs decide to apply low visibility 
procedures (LVP). Even though ATCOs would not define the exact visibility limits in terms of 
equivalent runway visual range (RVR), they could imagine that longitudinal spacing with LVP could 
be reduced with the use of an A-SMGCS (see debriefing results of active A-SMGCS ATCOs [26]). 
 
4.6 Recommendations related to implementation issues 
4.6.1 Cost/benefit considerations 
There are no cost/benefit recommendations coming out of EMMA. The fourth layer “operational 
benefits” of the EMMA V&V methodology (cf. Figure 4-1) takes into account the comparison 
between cost savings caused by A-SMGCS operational improvements compared to all related 
implementation and maintenance costs. Quantities for operational improvements, like reduced taxi 
times or reduced load of the R/T voice communication, are provided by EMMA but the translation of 
the operational effects into monetary values was out of the scope of EMMA and should be done by the 
respective stakeholders, since they are in the better position to do so. 
4.6.2 Safety assessment 
The preparation of the EMMA functional hazard assessment (FHA) (cf. the EMMA FHA report 
D1.3.9, [13]) led to the provision of recommendations with respect to the contents of the ICAO  
A-SMGCS manual [31]. The EMMA FHA focuses on safety assessment in the ATM domain.  
 
It should be realised that A-SMGCS operations can also drastically change the way of working of 
pilots, particularly with higher A-SMGCS implementation levels. Therefore, the EMMA “General 
Safety Concept” [10] describes a safety assessment plan for performing a safety assessment covering 
well all interactions between the ATM domain, the aircraft operations domain and the aircraft system 
domain. This plan also makes use of SAM as a safety assessment method for the ATM domain, and 
identifies some further areas in which SAM is recommended to improve.  
 
The following safety assessment related recommendations have been derived in EMMA: 
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a) The terms “system” and “equipment” should be used with more differentiation from the ICAO 
A-SMGCS manual [31]. For a safety analysis, it is required to define the system as a 
combination of physical components (i.e. equipment), procedures, and human resources 
organised to perform a function. This definition could also be used for the description of the 
operational & performance requirements in the ICAO manual. 
 
b) In the ICAO manual on A-SMGCS (§5.5, [31]) there is no mention of the recent 
EUROCONTROL work on its safety assessment methodology (SAM). With release 2, the 
SAM has grown more mature (even if it will continue to develop and improve) and is tailored 
to safety assessment in the ATM domain. However, it is recommended to mention SAM in the 
ICAO manual [31] as a possible way of doing safety assessment restricted to the ATM 
domain. 
 
c) With respect to the most severe hazard, it may be valuable to introduce on-board services in 
an early implementation step of an A-SMGCS concept.  
 
d) With its higher levels, A-SMGCS will drastically change the role of pilots. Hence, the ICAO 
manual has a broader scope than just the ‘ATM provision’ considered by ESARR4 [7] and 
SAM [2]. Hence, also JAR/EASA regulations concerning aircraft systems and aircraft 
operations are of importance (cf. also the EMMA “General Safety Concept” document [10]).  
 
4.6.3 Training & licensing 
4.6.3.1 Recommendations related to ATCOs  
For already licensed ATCOs, implementation of A-SMGCS will require upgrade training. It is 
recommended to develop training associated with the subsequent levels of A-SMGCS implementation. 
For student and trainee ATCOs, the unit training plans should be amended to reflect the competence 
required to operate the implemented levels of A-SMGCS [12].  
 
It is recommended to implement A-SMGCS licensing as an endorsement within ATCO ratings. 
Successful completion of the A-SMGCS levels 1&2 upgrade training for already licensed ATCOs 
should be reported to the designated licensing authority. Subsequently, and associated with a valid 
ADI/TWR, or ADI/GMC rating, an A-SMGCS (levels 1&2) rating endorsement should be entered in 
the ATCOs licence. 
4.6.3.2 Recommendations related to flight crews 
It is recommended with the implementation of A-SMGCS at several airports that flight crew training 
should include the knowledge of those A-SMGCS aspects relevant for flight crews. Flight crews 
should be provided with the training necessary for them to understand the system and their associated 
duties in terms of the introduced transponder operating procedures. It is necessary that training permits 
flight crews to comply with aerodrome, A-SMGCS, and ATC procedures. 
 
In accordance with ICAO Annex 1, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have developed Joint 
Aviation Requirements for flight crew Licensing (JAR-FCL). For aeroplane flight crews JAR FCL – 1 
is applicable [7] for training and licensing of private, commercial and airline flight crews. It is 
recommended that the JAA should incorporate relevant provisions in JAR FCL-1 for the use of A-
SMGCS, e.g. required minimum level of theoretical and practical knowledge, training syllabi, skill test 
contents, and requirements considering up-to-date knowledge for the prolongation and renewal of 
licenses. Up to now, no specific licensing requirements have been developed with regard to A-
SMGCS. 
 
 
EMMA 
Recommendations Report DLR 
 
Save date: 2007-02-07 Public Page 17 
File Name: D681_RECOM_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
4.6.3.3 Recommendations related to vehicle drivers  
It is recommended for the implementation of A-SMGCS that training should include the knowledge of 
those A-SMGCS aspects that are relevant for vehicle drivers active on the movement area, including 
the use of radiotelephony and navigation competencies. Vehicle drivers should be provided with the 
training necessary for them to understand their duties and to permit them to comply with aerodrome, 
A-SMGCS, ATC procedures. 
 
4.7 Recommendations to the stakeholders 
4.7.1 Recommendations to users  
The following recommendations to users (ATCOs, pilots, and vehicle drivers) are important for the 
smooth implementation of A-SMGCS. They are also important to guarantee a high acceptance of the 
system by the users. 
 
a) Users should be actively involved in the entire process of A-SMGCS implementation relevant 
to their tasks from the first stage of project planning until operational use of the system. 
 
b) It is important that users specify their needs and requirements with regard to A-SMGCS and 
that they are directly involved in the process of system and supplier selection. Operational 
users have to work with the new system – they know which functions and system design 
would be most beneficial for their tasks. 
 
c) Users should familiarise themselves with the new A-SMGCS functions that affect them as 
early as possible and give early feedback to the system designers especially with regard to 
change requests or adaptations of the system functions. 
 
d) For a smooth system implementation it is necessary that users know the relevant system 
documentation and that they use the provided the necessary system training sessions to an 
optimum degree.  
 
e) All changes in procedures and responsibilities should be made available and briefed to the 
affected users well in advance of the system cut-over. 
 
f) Workload aspects should be taken into consideration. A-SMGCS may have an influence on 
workload, particularly on the workload of tower controllers. Controllers should give critical 
feedback on these issues and if necessary suggest changes with regard to responsibility and 
organisation of the controller positions in the tower. 
 
4.7.2 Recommendations to A-SMGCS R&D 
The reported verification and validation results (Ref. [26], [27], and [28]) contain indications about the 
additional R&D needed. Related to the surveillance and control functions of A-SMGCS, the main 
recommendations are reported below: 
 
a) Develop and test a standard and recommended practice (SARP) for A-SMGCS surveillance 
system performance verification, calibration, and approval2.  
 
b) Investigate the optimal use of real-time tower simulation in the context of runway incursion 
alert development of systems and procedures. Make recommendations for a typical runway 
                                                     
2  cf. also EUROCAE ED-87A [30], which is currently updated with this respect 
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incursion alerting (RIA) development and integration programme that can be used by airports 
and ANSPs to install an operational RIA function. 
 
c) Investigate the role and effectiveness of other sensors than those used in EMMA to improve 
the RIA function (e.g. magnetic loops, extra stop bar sensors, or electro-magnetic fences). 
 
d) Study the combined (runway incursion) alerting situation (both an alert facility in the cockpits 
and in the tower). 
 
e) Develop, test, and standardise methods to measure the airport (ATM and A-SMGCS-related) 
efficiency (minimum required parameters, testing period, conditions, etc.). 
 
4.7.3 Recommendations to industry 
a) With the implementation of an A-SMGCS an extensive period for the adaptation (tuning) of 
the system should be planned, before the system can provide the expected performance. 
 
b) It can be advantageous for the monitoring and alerting function to be tested by local 
operational controllers in a simulation environment prior to the integration at the airport, in 
order to give a realistic impression of its operational performance and to adapt it to the users’ 
needs.  
 
c) HMI design aspects are important and should be given high priority. An optimised HMI will 
be a pre-condition for the handling of the new A-SMGCS functions in the cockpit, in the 
control tower and in special vehicles. 
 
d) Maintenance costs of an A-SMGCS should not be underestimated. 
 
4.7.4 Recommendations to the European Commission’s policy 
a) In the light of the EMMA results, the EMMA consortium is recommending the EC to pursue 
close co-ordination with other international bodies (e.g. EUROCONTROL) to formulate a 
joint European approach in the effort to update A-SMGCS standard and regulatory documents 
(e.g. ICAO, EUROCAE), as well as to assure co-ordination with non-European bodies, like 
the Federal Aviation Agency, with the aim to approach ICAO in a co-ordinated way.  
 
b) SESAR, the Single European Sky implementation programme, is just starting its first phase 
called the Definition Phase. In March 2008, the definition phase will deliver an ATM master 
plan defining the content, the development, and deployment plans of the next generation of 
ATM systems. Therefore, the EMMA consortium is recommending the EC to support the 
EMMA accomplishments in order to feed the SESAR Definition Phase and more specifically 
the part related to future airport developments. 
 
c) In EMMA2, higher-level A-SMGCS services that were initially identified in the conceptual 
part of EMMA will be further addressed. Past experiences in developing initial A-SMGCS 
levels show that there definitely is a long way from R&D to implementation. Hopefully, with 
a solid basis of A-SMGCS surveillance and initial control functions and thanks to the EMMA 
and other related European projects, future development and implementation of higher level 
A-SMGCS services will take a quicker pace. Nevertheless, the EMMA consortium is 
recommending the EC to support future development of these services in the upcoming EC 
programmes in order to speed up operational deployment. 
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d) The EMMA consortium would further recommend to the European Commission not to split 
extensive Integrated Projects in only two years lasting projects within one framework 
programme. Such a small project time compared with the high amount of contributing partners 
and ambitious objectives lacks efficiency in terms of reaching the project technical goals. 
Important phases of the E-OCVM approach or the well-proven iterative test cycle approach, 
which usually includes preparation, accomplishment, and evaluation of the trials, are 
important but they also need sufficient time. Overlaps of external project phases (project 
proposal phase, reporting phase) of EMMA and EMMA2 projects occurred and caused 
overloads of resources for the partners that were involved in both projects. 
 
4.8 Recommendations related to a concept for higher A-SMGCS 
levels 
The EMMA consortium conducted a study to identify a comprehensive A-SMGCS concept that allows 
incorporating the full scope of surveillance, control, routing and guidance services as well as new 
onboard-related A-SMGCS services. This concept work prepared the follow-up project, EMMA2. The 
concept aimed to support the stepwise implementation of a complete A-SMGCS and delivered 
recommendations for A-SMGCS “implementation packages” that are tailored to the user’s needs. The 
results were an output of several workshops with A-SMGCS users, industry, and R&D organisations. 
 
The EMMA implementation packages go beyond the already existing EUROCONTROL, EUROCAE, 
and ICAO A-SMGCS implementation level definitions because they also consider equipment and 
procedures of each specific A-SMGCS service. The new term packages was chosen to distinguish the 
EMMA definition from the term ‘implementation level’. This definition of implementation levels 
proved to be insufficient in meeting the needs of stakeholders during a stepwise implementation of a 
full scope A-SMGCS.  
 
EUROCONTROL’s and EUROCAE’s definition with its four implementation levels focuses on the 
main four A-SMGCS functions: surveillance, control, guidance, and routing, which works fine with 
surveillance and control because these two functions depend on each other logically in a successive 
way and do not consider the onboard part, except for the transponder. Moreover, these two services 
are mainly used to assist the users, thus procedures do not have to be changed fundamentally, and 
interoperability to other services is not a critical issue.  
 
The implementation of automated routing or guidance services, however, would increase the 
complexity of the A-SMGCS and their operational use still lacks maturity. A concept for those higher 
levels has to give careful consideration to changing operational procedures, shifting responsibilities 
from human to equipment (e.g. visual reference vs. electronic display), introducing automated on-
board services and equipments, as well as to the interrelations between the A-SMGCS functions.  
 
Current level 3 and level 4 concepts do not help here anymore as they do not adequately address the 
full scope of A-SMGCS operational use. ICAO considers the responsibility shift between controllers, 
pilots, and equipment for all A-SMGCS services, which must be seen as a first step, but does not give 
sufficient information on procedures with which the system is used nor does it describe what technical 
enablers would be needed and what service performance level the users can expect. 
 
EMMA implementation steps for A-SMGCS services 
The EMMA operational concept approach started with extending the EUROCONTROL levels 1&2 
concept [5] [6] with a detailed description of all A-SMGCS services that includes guidance, routing, 
planning, and on-board services, as well as an extension of surveillance and control services. This was 
done for each of the three main users of an A-SMGCS: air traffic controllers (ATCO), flight crews, 
and vehicle drivers.  
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The second step was to look for appropriate technical enablers that are needed to bring the service to 
life.  
 
The third step was to give recommendations for successive implementation steps for each A-SMGCS 
service. Table 4-1 depicts the arrangement of implementation steps for each A-SMGCS service in the 
recommended order. The services are attributed to the main users – ATCO, pilots, and vehicle drivers 
– and aligned with a timeline (cf. also EMMA OSED document, §2, [9]).  
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Timeline             (t) 
ROP 
EMM 
HUD 
S1 
C1 
G1 
R1 
A1 
V1 
Runway Occupancy Planning 
Electronic Airport Moving Map 
Head-Up Display 
Surveillance Service for ATCOs step 1 
Control Service for ATCOs step 1 
Ground guidance means Service for ATCOs step 1 
Routing Service for ATCOs step 1 
Onboard Services for flight crews step 1 
Onboard Service for Vehicle Drivers step 1 
Table 4-1: A-SMGCS services and implementation steps 
 
From implementation steps to implementation packages 
Having defined evolutionary implementation steps for each A-SMGCS service the users can cluster 
them into implementation packages (IPs), which exactly meet their operational needs at the airport. To 
support this process EMMA recommended special implementation packages in accordance to the 
airport needs, considering the airport complexity, traffic volume, and prevailing visibility conditions 
(cf. §5, OSED, [9]). 
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Implementation of innovative systems at airports is driven by a number of factors, amongst which is 
the budget to be spent, political pressure, and image. Numerous innovative systems have been site-
accepted and never used due to lack of consistency with the other tools and the environment, lack of 
procedures and training, or inadequate performance to the real needs. However, for the situations in 
which operational needs for an A-SMGCS are the main driving factor for its implementation, the 
implementation packages defined in EMMA (cf. [9]) are recommended so as to build up an acceptable 
equilibrium between equipment, procedures, and interoperability with adjacent systems. 
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5 Remaining open issues 
5.1 Issues related to A-SMGCS surveillance 
The EMMA project found evidence that the A-SMGCS Surveillance service has reached a very high 
maturity. Today it provides full benefits to the ATC community in the operational environment. Hence 
only a few open issues remain with regard to improving this service. Nevertheless, the EMMA 
consortium wants to highlight a crucial element for the successful operational use of A-SMGCS: 
Compliance to Transponder Operating Procedures. During EMMA V&V activities, it has been 
recognised that flight crews do not comply with these procedures consistently even when they are 
published in AIPs and are known to the airlines. This issue is a key element for the adequate operation 
of A-SMGCS on airports and has to be solved. 
 
To a lesser degree, an issue has been identified related to the use of the A-SMGCS surveillance service 
in visibility 3 conditions, when controllers cannot see outside and when pilots cannot apply “see and 
be seen”.. Controllers’ opinions indicate that longitudinal spacing in low visibility operations could be 
reduced with the use of A-SMGCS. This idea introduces a definition of separation on the ground, 
which does not exist at the moment, as well as a definition of associated procedures to operate in VIS-
3 conditions to maintain the separation minima. 
 
5.2 Issues related to A-SMGCS control 
The A-SMGCS control service and, more specifically, the monitoring and alerting function have not 
reached a level of maturity that permits full operational use at the EMMA airports. For the time being, 
only basic conflict alerting algorithms, like automatic alerts with aircraft or vehicle movements 
crossing a lit stop bar, are implemented and operational at Prague-Ruzynĕ. However, real-time 
simulations and live flight tests, which were used in EMMA to evoke more complex conflict situations 
(e.g. arrival-arrival conflicts with crossing runways), show very promising results regarding 
controllers’ acceptance. Solutions to allow a more developed monitoring and alerting function 
implementation should be investigated in further research activities.  
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6.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ADI/GMC Aerodrome Control Instrument/ Ground Movement Control 
ADI/TWR Aerodrome Control Instrument/ Tower 
ADS-B Automatic Dependant Surveillance – Broadcast 
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication 
ANS CR Air Navigation Services Czech Republic 
ANSP Air Navigation Services Providers 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATCO Air Traffic Controller 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
AUEB Athens University of Economics and Business 
 
EMMA 
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Abbreviation Meaning 
BETA operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing an A-SMGCS 
CPDLC Controller Pilot Data Link Communication 
DEFAMM Demonstration Facilities for Airport Movement guidance control and Management 
DSNA Direction des Services de la Navigation Aérienne (French Air Navigation Services)
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
EMM Electronic Moving Map 
ENAV Italian Company for Air Navigation Services 
E-OCVM European Operational Concept Validation Methodology 
ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement 
ETG EuroTelematik AG 
FCL Flight Crew Licensing 
FHA Functional Hazard Assessment 
GND Ground 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
JAA Joint Aviation Authority 
JAR Joint Aviation Requirement 
LVO Low Visibility Operation 
LVP Low Visibility Procedures 
MAEVA Master ATM European Validation Plan 
NOTAM Notice To Airman 
OSED Operational Service And Environmental Description (EMMA) 
RTS Real-Time Simulation 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
SAM Safety Assessment Methodology 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
TATM Thales ATM 
THAV Thales Avionics 
TREN Transport and Energy 
TUD Technische Universitaet Darmstadt 
TWR Tower 
TWY Taxiway 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VGH Validation Guideline Handbook 
 
